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Experimental test of the effect of imposing a penalty on buyers in 
a specific market structure 
1. Introduction 
This article examines one side of the Australian Federal Coalition Government’s mandatory 
renewable energy target (MRET) policy (i.e. the presence of penalty in a specific market 
structure). The objective of this policy is to increase the market share of renewable energy 
technologies  in  the  Electricity  Supply  Industry  (ESI)  in  Australia.  Renewable  energy 
technologies are less emission intensive than conventional fossil-fuel electricity generation 
technologies.  Therefore,  the  increased  market  share  of  renewable  energy  technologies  is 
expected  to  result  in  reduced  emissions  from  the  electricity  industry  and  corresponding 
improvements  in  environmental  quality.  The  problem,  however,  is  that  renewable  energy 
technologies  are  in  general  more  expensive  than  conventional  fossil-fuel  generation 
technologies. The recent reforms of the ESI in Australia which resulted in the restructuring of 
the electricity sector and the introduction of competition in the generation and retail sectors 
have reduced the opportunities for renewable energy to be adopted by electricity generating 
companies due to the generally higher costs of producing electricity from renewable energy 
compared with the cost of electricity production from conventional non- renewable energy 
technologies.  
One  approach  to  achieving  the  goal  of  increasing  the  market  share  of  renewable  energy 
technologies in the ESI at least cost to retailers is to create a market for renewable energy 
certificates  (RECs).  Producers  of  renewable  energy  receive  a  certificate  for  each  unit  of 
renewable energy  they  produced and  then  sell certificates  to  retailers  to  recover  costs  of 
production of electricity from renewable energy. In Australia, electricity retailers are required 
to buy a certain amount of RECs from electricity producers that use renewable energy to 
generate electricity. If retailers do not have the required amount of RECs by a certain day, 
they  have  to  pay  a  penalty  for  each  certificate  they  are  lacking.  The  structure  of  the 
Queensland REC market can be described as an oligopoly on the supply side and competitive 
on the demand side. 
The effect of the penalty on the market outcome is not strongly developed in the literature. 
The closest approximation is to consider the effect of a price ceiling on market behaviour. 
Although the price ceiling is not exactly the penalty, it represents a constraint in the market 
and, thus, can give an idea of the way the market will behave. The results of this type of study 
were taken as a guide to understand the effect of imposing a constraint in the market. The   AARES 2007    3 
effect of a penalty in the REC market was examined by Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000). 
Their study, however, was not concerned with the specifics of the market, such as market 
structure, but more with the influence of banking and borrowing
1 on investments and the price 
of green certificates.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the problem of the existence 
of a penalty in a market for RECs. Section 3 describes the methodology of the experiment. 
Section 4 discusses the results of the experiments. Section 5 summarises the major findings.  
2. Review of the Literature   
The REC market in Australia imposes a penalty on retailers and large consumers of electricity 
if they fail to acquire specified amounts of RECs for electricity they purchase. The behaviour 
of market participants in the presence of a penalty is important to examine. A penalty can be 
seen as the maximum price retailers and large buyers are willing to pay for RECs (Schaeffer 
and Sonnemans, 2000:410). In theory, in a competitive market, renewable energy electricity 
generators will submit their offers for RECs at their marginal costs. In practice, however, 
some participants (e.g. retailers and large consumers) have a mandatory demand for RECs. 
This means that producers of electricity from renewable energy know that there is a demand 
for RECs. Moreover, they know that if retailers and large consumers do not purchase the 
required amount of RECs, they have to pay a penalty. Renewable energy producers also know 
the level of the penalty. That knowledge could give producers an advantage by setting the 
price above marginal costs if they are given an opportunity to do so. 
The situation in REC market is complicated by the potential of a small number of large 
producers to exercise market power. McLennan Magasanik Associates (2002) in their report 
entitled, “Modelling the Price of RECs Under the Mandatory Energy Target”, noted some 
problems associated with the REC market in Australia. Among others, one of the problems 
mentioned was the possible exercise  of market power by a small number of large RECs 
producers. The presence of one or two large renewable energy producers with a large market 
share can, in theory, lead to the price being higher than would occur in a competitive market.  
                                                
1 The RECs market with fixed demand and a varying supply of RECs can potentially have two extreme 
scenarios: zero prices for certificates if there is oversupply of RECs on the market or (2) maximum prices (set by 
the penalty) if there is shortage of RECs on the market. To avoid these scenarios the flexibility mechanisms can 
be used. Such mechanisms, namely banking and borrowing of RECs, were explored in Schaeffer and Sonnemans 
(2000).   AARES 2007    4 
These issues are difficult to examine using conventional economic models, such as simulation 
models, because these models cannot capture the behaviour of market participants. However, 
there is a possibility to examine these issues using experimental economics.  
Despite  extensive  literature  on  the  operation  of  the  deregulated  electricity  market  and 
experimental work on the operation of emission permit trading markets, there is a limited 
body of literature on the efficiency of the RECs markets. An interesting discussion on this 
subject is the paper by Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000), entitled: “The influence of banking 
and borrowing under different penalty regimes in tradable green certificates markets - results 
from an experimental economics laboratory experiment”. 
The main issues Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000) were concerned about were the level of 
compliance  with  the  mandatory  RECs,  the  price  of  RECs,  and  investments  in  renewable 
energy technologies. Banking and borrowing under different levels of penalty were the main 
focus  of  the  experiment  by  Schaeffer  and  Sonnemans  (2000).  The  following  two  main 
conclusions relevant to this paper were derived from the experiments about the role of a 
penalty were given by Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000): 
1.  High penalties drive up prices in early periods, leading to over investment and a price 
crash in the later periods. 
2.  The average price of RECs was a little bit above the penalty level, which was caused 
by the relatively large share of the voluntary demand in the market. 
Economic theory suggests that, in a competitive market, the level of maximum price allowed 
does not have an effect on the behaviour of participants, as long as the maximum price is 
higher than competitive equilibrium level. In the context of this research, this means that, if a 
penalty is considered as a price cap for sellers, as long as the level of the penalty is above the 
equilibrium  level  of  the  competitive  price  for  RECs,  it  will  not  affect  the  behaviour  of 
participants if the market is competitive. 
However, an alternative theory of sellers’ behaviour in competitive markets with non-binding 
price  controls  was  suggested  by  Scherer  (1970), and  cited  in  Isaac  and  Plott  (1981).  He 
argued that sellers can adopt a collusive behaviour. The argument was that sellers could use 
the non-binding ceiling price as a focal point for tacit collusion to keep prices above the CE 
prices.   AARES 2007    5 
Isaac  and  Plott  (1981),  followed  by  Smith  (1982),  pioneered  experimental  research 
concerning price control and its effect on the efficiency of the market. The objective of the 
study by Isaac and Plott (1981) was to examine the behaviour of a competitive market under 
an imposed price control. 
Isaac and Plott (1981) reported the main conclusion that under non-binding price control, 
market behaviour supports the competitive model rather than the “focal point” model. In non-
binding price control experiments the mean price tends to be near the competitive equilibrium 
price, not the control price
2. 
However, results of experiments by Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000), indicated that the high 
price  ceiling  can  serve  as  a  focal  point  for  suppliers  to  offer  their  product.  The  typical 
outcome  of  high-penalty  sessions  was  that  prices  were  higher  than  for  a  competitive 
equilibrium price. The results of the Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000) experiment suggested 
that the “focal point” model is the best representation of the market especially in the case 
where banking is allowed.  
Isaac and Plott (1981:459) proposed to include expectations, strategic behaviour and/or the 
availability of the market information to participants to be included in further research of 
price control.   
3. Methodology of the Experiment 
The  rest  of  the  paper  adopted  words  “sellers”  to  represent  “producers”  and  “buyers”  to 
represent “retailers”. That has been done for the sake of simplicity in the experiment. Subjects 
participating  in  the  experiment  might  struggle  with  the  notions  of  “retailer”  versus 
“producers”. The meaning of “sellers” and “buyers” is more familiar to the subjects.  
This experiment examined the case of an oligopolistic supply side when the demand side 
(buyers)  have  value  for  certificates  and  asks  the  question  of  whether  the  enforced 
participation  (i.e.  imposing  a  penalty  on  buyers  for  non-compliance)  puts  them  at  a 
disadvantage compared with sellers, resulting in the price of certificates other than would be 
expected in a oligopolistic market. The sellers’ knowledge that buyers will be subject to a 
penalty for non-compliance can give sellers an opportunity to set the price above the marginal 
costs of producing RECs.  
                                                
2 Smith and Williams (1981) developed the Isaac and Plott (1981) experimental design further isolating any 
effects of a non-binding control on price convergence behaviour.   AARES 2007    6 
In the experiment, the strength of sellers’ position was enforced by the possibility to exercise 
market power. That has been achieved by imposing a capacity constraint. In the experiment, 
three questions were asked of the observed results: (i) does the existence of penalty have any 
effect on price of RECs, (ii) can market power in the certificates market be exploited by the 
seller if given the opportunity, and (iii) if yes, is the resulting outcome serious enough to merit 
special consideration by regulators? Communication among participants was not allowed to 
exclude collusion between sellers. 
The experiment used the following assumptions and rules: 1) in the experiment, a buyer has 
an obligation to buy one REC unit each period (if a buyer does not purchase the required 
amount of units, he/she faces a penalty); 2) the existence of the penalty is common knowledge 
to everyone in the market; and 3) trade in certificates in the experiment is conducted using a 
double auction. The theoretically derived estimates of oligopolistic outcomes were compared 
with the experimental results.  
The number of subjects should be on the one hand large enough to answer the particular 
research question and to perform statistical analysis and, on the other hand, small enough to 
fit the budget. Since this research is aimed to test the effect of an oligopoly market, as an 
approximation  of  the  REC  market  in  Australia.  The  number  of  students  to  represent  an 
oligopoly has been chosen as two (utilizing duopoly as an example of an oligopolistic market 
structure). The number for the competitive (demand side) of the market has been chosen as 
six. The reason is that  
…competitive outcomes are almost always obtained in non-monopolized double auction 
markets  with  private  incomplete  information  and  stationary  supply  and  demand 
conditions. It holds true for as many as four sellers (Kagel and Roth 1995:393, see also 
Smith et al., 1982). 
Therefore, six buyers seem to be large enough for approximating competition on the buyers’ 
side using double auction as a trading instrument. The general set up of the experiment is 
shown in Figure 1. The boxes on the left hand side with arrows pointing into “Sellers” box are 
the different treatments on the seller side. The boxes on the right hand side with arrows 
pointing into “Buyers” box are the different treatments on the buyer side. University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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Hypothesis 1: 
This hypothesis tests the effect of enforced participation, i.e. the effect of the existence of a 
penalty on the buyers’ side. It is hypothesised that when one part of the market is forced to 
participate for fear of incurring loss, they would be willing to accept much higher prices than 
otherwise. On the other hand, the presence of the penalty might induce aggressive behaviour 
on the buyers’ side. If they know that they might lose money due to the penalty, they might 
adopt a strategy to bid very low to cover a possible loss in some other periods. 
H0: Price of units when the penalty is imposed on buyers
3 given an oligopoly market on the 
sellers’ side = Price of units without penalty imposed on buyers in oligopoly market on the 
sellers’ side. 
H1: Price of units when the penalty is imposed on buyers given an oligopoly market on the 
sellers’ side ≠ Price of units without the penalty imposed on buyers given an oligopoly market 
on the sellers’ side. 
Hypothesis 2: 
The experiment runs for many periods for each treatment. The effect of learning the policy 
due to playing several periods is tested by this hypothesis. The same market structure is used 
as in hypothesis one. 
H0: The trading behaviour in achieving a competitive equilibrium price does not change as 
market participants learn the policy 
H1: The trading behaviour in achieving a competitive equilibrium price does change as market 
participants learn the policy 
Information given to participants 
Subjects were not informed about the problems and context underlying the experiment, hence 
they did not know that they traded RECs. This was done in order not to impose the context of 
the  experiment  on  participants.  The  knowledge  of  the  context  of  the  experiment  might 
influence the strategies subjects chose due to their own perceptions about renewable energy. 
                                                
3 Buyers are in a competitive market, sellers are in an oligopoly market University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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If participants had this information, the decision making process could be distorted and thus 
reduce the validity of results. 
Sellers were given individual costs for units of the product they produce. They were informed 
that buyers would have to pay a penalty if they did not buy a unit. 
Two oligopolistic producers, shown in the Table 1 can choose to sell up to three units each. 
For each unit they sell they incur the cost for this unit. If they don’t sell anything, they do not 
pay the cost of producing one unit. The supply function is usually symmetrical to the demand 
function (Smith and Williams, 1981 and Isaac and Plott, 1981). However, in this experiment 
sellers need to make a decision for a few units, the cost function has been simplified to reduce 
the  information  burden  on  subjects.  The  costs  of  the  supply  function  are  given  as  two 
numbers, laboratory (lab) lab$10 and lab$20 per unit. Table 1 shows costs for sellers. 
Table 1. Laboratory firm costs. 
  Units  Production cost, lab$/unit 
Producer 1     
  1  10 
  2  10 
  3  20 
Number of units supplied  3   
Producer 2     
  1  10 
  2  10 
  3  20 
Number of units supplied  3   
Total number of units supplied  6   
 
Buyers were given individual values for units. They were aware of the penalty. The level of 
the  penalty  was  known  to  all  participants.  During  the  sessions,  one  of  the  tasks  of  the 
experimental software was to check whether obligations were met after every period and to 
apply penalties if necessary. 
Buyers profit is the difference between the price buyers pay for a unit in the auction and the 
maximum value they are given. In the treatment with penalty all buyers have an obligation to 
have one unit at the end of each period. A buyer not having a unit at the end of the period will 
pay a penalty. In this case this buyer will not receive a value for the absent unit. Speculative 
behaviour at the auction can increase profit if successful, but buyers will not receive a value 
for any additional unit. This type of speculation is possible due to the nature of the double University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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auction but it is not the focus of this research. Note, that paying the penalty is not in the 
interest of the buyers. Table 2 shows values for buyers. 
Table 2. Laboratory buyers values. 
  Units  Value, lab$/unit 
Buyer 1  1  120 
Buyer 2  1  100 
Buyer 3  1  80 
Buyer 4  1  60 
Buyer 5  1  40 
Buyer 6  1  20 
Total number of units demanded  6   
 
The total demand is six units. The demand curve intersects the supply curve at the equilibrium 



















Figure 2. Equilibrium price in the experiment 
The cost of each unit is the same for each firm (two units at $10/unit and one unit at $20/unit). 
At the competitive equilibrium price of $20, the total profit of oligopolistic firms is $40. 
If one is to test the possibility of sellers to exercise market power, the specific parameters for 
subjects should give them an opportunity to exercise market power. In the experiment this is 
achieved by fixing the total supply by withholding a unit from sale to increase the equilibrium 
price. However, sellers were not made aware of the possibility of manipulating the market 
price  by  withholding  units.  Therefore  they  were  expected  to  act  as  a)  competitors  or  b) 
oligopolists by restricting output (if they work out this possibility). University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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The optimal output for each oligopolist
4 according to the Cournot equilibrium (where firms 






xi , where xi is the output of i
th firm out of the total 
demand  and  n  is  the  number  of  firms.  If  there  are  two  producers  making  simultaneous 
decisions about quantities they are selling, the optimal output for each would be one third of 
the total demand, i.e. two units each
5.  
If oligopolistic firms realise that by restricting output they can increase the equilibrium price 
of the unit, the optimal strategy for each firm would be to produce only two units. This would 
give the duopolists a total profit range between $120 and $200 because the equilibrium price 
would increase to the range between $40/unit and $60/unit (the intersection of demand and 



















Figure 3. Supply and demand in the experiment if oligopolists restrict their outputs. 
 
Within this context, the possibility to exercise market power further by the producer firm is to 
use knowledge of the existence of the penalty to sellers for not buying a certificate. The 
                                                
4 If it were a monopoly firm, the optimal output would be 3 units at lab$60- lab$80 price that would eventuate a 
monopoly profit of lab$210. 
5 Oligopoly or duopoly in this experiment, can be seen within the game theory framework. It is assumed that the 
two firms behave in a way that will maximise their profit. There are three ways how duopolists can do it. First, 
they can collude explicitly. This option was ruled out in the experiment by not allowing any communication 
between market participants. Second, duopolists can use tacit collusion. In the experiment, there was no time to 
follow another firm’s decision. Also, both firms have the same number of units and the same costs. There is no 
dominant firm among sellers. Third, firms could merge but it was not allowed in the experiment. Moreover, the 
firms did not face a “prisoner’s dilemma” because the output of one firm could only meet exactly half of the 
demand and the prices one firm charged were not effecting the second firm’s prices. Each of the oligopoly firms 
can only produce a fixed amount of output. University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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resulting contract price is expected to be near the high end (up to $60/unit) of the price range 
if producers are able to act aggressively, knowing that sellers will pay the penalty if they 
don’t buy a unit. The penalty for this experiment is set at $80 unit.  
4. Results  
Participants 
There were 18 participants, university students, both male and female of equal number, all 
aged a few years either side of 20. The recruitment of students took place at the University of 
Queensland by announcing the possibility for students to participate in a decision-making 
experiment among the students of economics courses. Contact details of the principal 
investigator had been given to students. Students were required to indicate their willingness to 
participate in the experiment by contacting the principal investigator. Interested students had 
been informed about place, time and date of the experiment. 
Before the Experiment 
Before the experiment started, participants were provided with the instructions. They were 
informed  about  the  nature  of  the  experiment  but  not  about  the  exact  purpose  of  the 
experiment, so the results would not be biased. 
Participants had been required to sign a consent form after they read the “Instructions to 
Subjects”,  both  to  register  their  interest  in  participating  and  before  the  experiment  was 
conducted. Participants were free to sign in just prior to the experiment if there was a shortage 
of participants. Two late participants were asked to remain in the computer laboratory as a 
reserve in case someone decided to quit the experiment. A fixed fee of $20/person was paid to 
these participants if no one withdrew. 
This experiment took place electronically via networked computers, thus instructions and tests 
were in electronic form. Roles were assigned to subjects in an arbitrary way. The subjects had 
to answer a few questions at the end of the instructions to check whether they understood their 
roles. Before the actual experiment started five test periods were played. Although it was 
planned to have only two practice periods, the actual experiment has shown that two periods 
for practice is not enough for students to fully grasp their roles. Therefore the number of test 
periods was increased to five. The test periods did not influence the final earnings of the 
subjects as explained in the section above. At the end of the experiment, the budget of each University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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subject was converted into real money and given to the subjects. Participants’ names were not 
recorded or published in the final results. 
Trading Rules of an Experiment 
Trading  rules  were  as  follows:  The  market  experiment  was  conducted  as  a  multi  period 
double auction.  Any seller or buyer was able to bid at any time, any quantity, at any price 
subject to capacity and budget constraints. The market was set to be transparent. 
Information on prices of offers and bids and the price of every transaction were shown to 
every  subject.  All  subjects  were  given  an  initial  budget  of  1,000  laboratory  dollars 
(lab$1,000).  Their  earnings  was  the  difference  between  their  budget  at  the  end  of  the 
experiment and the initial budget. These earnings were then converted into real money. 
Figure 4 shows the scatter plot of the contract price for one unit, by periods and by treatments. 
The first session of the experiment started by introducing the penalty into the market and then 
the treatment without the penalty was conducted. In the second session
6 of the experiment the 
order of treatments was altered. This was done to elicit the effect of the order of treatments. 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 4 shows the order for the second session that is the reverse of 
the actual order of treatments in the second session. The actual order of the second session 
was “no penalty” first and then “penalty” treatment second.  
According to Figure 4, the presence of the penalty has an effect on prices.  When the penalty 
was removed, the prices for the unit declined. In the second session, when the penalty was 
introduced, the prices jumped up and clustered around the level of the penalty, i.e. $80/unit. 
                                                
6 There were mostly different subjects and the session was run on a different day. University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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Source: Data from the experiment 
Figure 4. Contract price for one unit by periods and by treatments, 2004. 
During the penalty treatment in the first session, the average price of units declined by the end 
of the treatment (from about $100/unit to about $60/unit). The second treatment (no penalty) 
did  not  have  the  same  effect.  However,  in  the  first  treatment  of  the  second  session  (no 
penalty), prices rapidly converged to about $40/unit by the 7
th period.  
It can be seen from Figure 4 that once sellers and buyers have been informed about the 
introduction of the penalty, the prices in the market increased markedly.  
Session 2 
Session 1 University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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The  penalty  treatment  of  this  experiment  kept  prices  clustered  around  $100/unit.  The 
clustering  around  $100/unit  was  expected.  First,  because  the  penalty  is  $80/unit  and  the 
minimum  value  for  buyers  was  given  at  $20/unit.  The  price  at  $100/unit  makes  buyers 
indifferent between buying the unit or paying the penalty. However, many buyers have values 
more than $20/unit, thus it is in their interest to buy units at $100/unit and incur a smaller loss 
than otherwise would occur. For example, if a buyer has a value of one unit equal to $40/unit, 
and he/she buys a unit for $100/unit, his/her loss is $60/unit. Sixty dollars loss is less than 
paying $80/unit in penalty for not having a unit. 
Table  3  shows  the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  experiments.  Penalty  treatments  in  both 
experiments have, on average, higher prices than no penalty treatments. However, the mean 
contract price of a penalty session of the second experiment is higher than the one for the first 
experiment. One of the sellers was the same as in the first experiment. One of the possible 
explanations is that this seller became more experienced in trading compared with the first 
experiment. That proposition, however, has been rejected after formal testing on the equality 
of means for experienced sellers versus an un-experienced one.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the experiments.  
 
95%  Confidence 










Minimum  Maximum 
Session  1               
penalty 11 
sept 
105  86.98  27.66  81.62  92.33  10.00  180.00 
no penalty 11 
sept 
92  47.68  18.90  43.77  51.59  1.00  90.00 
Session  2               
no penalty 16 
oct 
88  39.31  13.26  36.50  42.12  18.00  90.00 
penalty 16 oct  92  95.52  7.59  93.94  97.09  54.00  110.00 
Total  377  68.35  30.53  65.25  71.44  1.00  180.00 
Source: Data from the first experiment. 
The maximum possible number of contracts in each treatment (without considering the re-
selling  option)  was  96  (6units  x  16  periods).  Sellers  were  exercising  market  power  by 
withholding one or two units, especially when the penalty to buyers was introduced. The large 
amount (105) of contracts in the penalty treatment in session 1 was due to buyers’ attempts to 
re-sell the units they acquired from sellers. This type of behaviour was diminished soon due to 
lack of time for such action. Buyers became more concerned with receiving a better price for 
the unit from sellers.  Sellers, on the other hand,  started to try to use their power and to University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
  AARES 2007    16 
withhold some units from selling (only a few units were withheld). What noticeable is that 
sellers did not use their market power in no penalty 2
nd session. 
Table 3 shows that the maximum price for the unit was $180. As explained above, if the 
subject’s value for one unit is $120 and the penalty is $80/unit, then subjects have to choose 
between two options when the seller offers the unit for $180. The first option is to not buy and 
to pay the penalty, which is a loss of $80. The second option is to buy the unit at the price of 
$180, and incur a loss of $60 ($120-$180). The loss in the second option is less than in the 
first one. The conclusion is that prices for units can be inflated and therefore they do not 
reflect  the  marginal  cost  of  supply  and  cannot  serve  as  a  means  of  efficient  resource 
allocation. Efficient resource allocation in this content means that high prices for units might 
attract higher investments in production of such units. Over investment can lead to collapsing 
prices as was shown in Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000) experiment. 
The theoretical competitive equilibrium price was $20/unit. However, since the sellers side 
was comprised of two firms, oligopolistic pricing was expected. The theoretical oligopolistic 
prices were between $40 and $60 per unit as explained earlier. The results have shown that 
the penalty affected the price increase above the expected oligopolistic prices.  The  mean 
contract price where the penalty was in place was about $87 and $96 per unit in the first and 
second sessions respectively. This means that the mark up ranged from 45% to almost 120%, 
averaging to 83% (Table 4).  University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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Table 4. Divergence of experimental results from theoretical estimates. 
Experimental price, $/unit 
“Penalty” treatment  “No penalty” treatment 
Session 1  Session 2  Session 1  Session 2 
87$/unit  96$/unit  48$/unit  39$/unit 
Theoretical price, $/unit 
   40  60  40  60  40  60  40  60 
Experimental price minus 
Theoretical price, lab$ (a)  47  27  56  36  8  -12  -1  -21 
Difference (a) to theoretical 
price, % (b)  118%  45%  140%  60%  20%  -20%  -3%  -35% 
Difference to the average 
theoretical price of $50, lab$ (c)  92%  74%  -4%  -22% 
Average for treatment to the 
average theoretical price of $50, 
lab$ (d)  83%  -13% 
Source: Data from experiments 
In  the  treatments  where  the  penalty  was  not  introduced,  prices  converged  to  the  average 
theoretical oligopolistic price in one session (almost zero difference) or to even lower than the 
average theoretical oligopolistic price in another session (average for that session was lower 
than  theoretically  predicted  by  22%).  The  average  experimental  price  for  “no  penalty” 
treatment was 13% less than theoretically predicted. This means that at times sellers did not 
exercise  their  market  power.  For  “no  penalty”  treatments,  the  examination  of  the  95% 
confidence  intervals  for  the  mean  price  of  units  showed  that  the  price  for  “no  penalty” 
treatment lies within theoretically predicted prices with an exception of the lower bound at 
session 2. The low prices in the second session might be due to more competitive behaviour 
from the buyers’ side who began to behave aggressively towards the end of the treatment. 
This suggests that the double auction market mechanism is a very effective one to achieve and 
maintain a competitive market outcome even in the duopolistic market structure. 
Table 5 provides the results of a one way analysis of variance for testing the 1
st hypothesis.  
Table 5. ANOVA for Contract price  
    Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  Sig. 
Between Groups  217829.914  3  72609.971  204.142  .000 
Within Groups  132669.868  373  355.683       
Total  350499.782  376          
 
Table 5 shows that there is a significant difference in the mean contract price in different 
treatments. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected and the conclusion can be drawn that there is University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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sufficient  evidence  that  the  mean  price  of  units,  when  a  penalty  for  non-compliance  is 
imposed on buyers in a competitive market and where the supply side is oligopolistic, is 
significantly different to the mean price of units when a penalty for non-compliance is not 
imposed on buyers in a competitive market and where the supply side is oligopolistic. 
In order to find out which treatment has the most effect on prices, the following tests for a 
difference, shown in Table 6, have been set.  
Table 6. Tests for a difference (contrast coefficients) 
Tests for a 
difference  Penalty 11 sept  No penalty 11 sept  Penalty 16 oct  No penalty 16 oct 
1  -1  -1  1  1 
2  -1  1  0  0 
3  0  0  -1  1 
4  -1  0  1  0 
5  0  -1  0  1 
 
The first test for a difference compares the means of the first session with the means of the 
second session. This test for a difference examines if there is any difference in the order of the 
treatments. The second test for a difference compares the penalty treatment from the first 
session with no penalty treatment from the same (first) session. The third test for a difference 
compares the penalty treatment in the second session with no penalty treatment in the same 
(second) session. The second and third tests for a difference are set to examine whether the 
penalty has an effect on price. The fourth and the fifth tests for a difference compare penalty 
and no penalty treatments in the first and second session respectively. Table 7 presents the 
results of the tests. 
Table 7.  Tests for a difference 
Contract 
price 
Test  for  a 
difference  Value of test  Std. Error  t  df  Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
1  .1742  3.71468  .047  262  .963 
2  -39.2962  3.34272  -11.756  185  .000 
3  -56.2036  1.62020  -34.689  137  .000 





5  -8.3666  2.42518  -3.450  164  .001 
 
                                                
7 The Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances has shown that the variances are not equal in the two sessions. 
Thus, the test for non equal variances should be used although tests, assuming equal variance, or not assuming 
equal variances, produced similar results.   University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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The test (Table 7) has shown that there are significant differences in contract prices due to the 
presence of the penalty (Figure 5) but not due to the order effect
8 (Figure 6). It is illustrated in 
Figure 5, where two box plots are presented for the prices in the two sessions.  


























Figure 5. Box plots of price per session 
 
The box plots summarise the median, quartiles and extreme values for the price variable, 
within clusters defined by a categorical variable, i.e. session. Each box within a cluster is 
defined by a second categorical variable, i.e. treatment (Figure 6). 
The two sessions have similar prices: when we compare the effect of introducing the penalty 
to the market or the effect of removing the penalty from the market, the resulting average 
market  price  of  units  will  be  similar.  In  the  context  of  oligopolistic  supply  side  market 
structure  if  the  penalty  is  introduced  and  then removed,  the  price  of  units  will  be  lower 
compared  with  the  situation  when  the  penalty  is  introduced  into  the  market  that  was 
functioning  without  the  penalty.  However,  if  a  penalty  free  market  existed  before  the 
                                                
8 An equality of means between sessions has been tested using the t-test for Equality of Means. This test has 
been performed to confirm the results obtained from the contrasts coefficients. 
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introduction of the penalty (session 2), the prices of units under “no penalty” treatment would 
be lower than after removing the penalty from the market (session 1). 
Figure 6.  Box plots of price per treatment. 
Figure 6, on the other hand, shows a significant difference in prices in different treatments.  
The learning effect is also significant even after controlling for treatment. Table 8 presents 
Anova table testing the effect of periods. 
Table 8. Anova test for the effect of period on contract price 
   Sum of Squares  Df  Mean Square  F  Sig. 
Regression  70098.248  2  35049.124  46.749  .000 
Residual  280401.535  374  749.737       
Total  350499.782  376          
 
The following analogy can be made: the longer the policy is in place, the closer the prices of 
RECs move to the competitive theoretical equilibrium due to the learning effect. The policy 
implication is clear – the policy should provide a stable environment for learning the rules and 
penalty 11 sept no penalty 11 
sept
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market  strategies  to  achieve  a  competitive  outcome.  It  means  that  abolishing  the  MRET 
policy already in place, as proposed by Parer (2002), may not give the REC market enough 
time to learn the rules and to become efficient in achieving the renewable energy target in a 
least cost manner. 
Table 9 provides the correlation coefficients for contract price, the number of periods and 
treatment. It shows that the contract price is negatively correlated with the period. This means 
that the contract prices for units declines during experiments as can be seen from the Figure 4 
possibly due to the learning effect.   
Table 9. Correlation coefficients (contract price, number of periods and treatment) 
      Contract price  Period  Treatment 
Pearson Correlation  Contract price  1.000     
   Period  -.280  1.000   
   Treatment  -.353  .014  1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed)  Contract price  .  .000  .000 
   Period  .000  .  .393 
   Treatment  .000  .393  . 
N  Contract price  377  377  377 
   Period  377  377  377 
   Treatment  377  377  377 
 
The statistical tests performed were conducted to determine whether the penalty has an effect 
on price setting in the market. The results have shown that such an effect exists. The effect of 
the order in which the penalty was imposed was not significant. The impact of oligopoly on 
the supply side when the penalty is present is such that the prices for REC are likely to be in 
their higher range even if oligopolistic firm does not restrict it’s output. The reason for a high 
price is the presence of a penalty that buyers would have to pay if they don’t comply with 
their regulatory obligation. The knowledge of the level of penalty works as a starting point for 
sellers to sell their units.  
5. Summary 
The experiment was set up to test the issues expressed in the McLennan Magasinik Associates 
report (1999) and the report named  “Modelling the Price of  RECs Under the Mandatory 
Energy Target”, also by McLennan Magasinik Associates (2002) whose (non-experimental) 
investigations expressed concern about, and indicated some evidence for, the existence of 
market power in the Australian REC market. A review of the relevant literature has suggested 
that the possible reason for high prices for RECs can be the presence of the penalty imposed 
on retailers for non-compliance.  This aspect of the REC market design was examined in University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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order to elicit this effect. The importance of price control in the REC market was pointed out 
by Voogt et al. (2000), who stated that the penalty is needed to make a market for RECs 
work.  
The effect of price control on the behaviour of a competitive market was investigated by Isaac 
and Plott (1981) and Smith (1982). Their research indicated that imposing the maximum price 
in a competitive market might cause divergence from the competitive equilibrium price. This 
means  that  the  penalty  as  a  maximum  price  might  have  an  effect  on  the  competitive 
equilibrium price of RECs. A penalty higher than this equilibrium  price might affect the 
market price for RECs. 
On the other hand, it was experimentally shown by Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000) that the 
size of the penalty plays an important role in the RECs market. Their results supported the 
“focal” theory of the role of a high penalty as a price control. When the penalty was set high, 
the price of certificates was higher than the competitive equilibrium price. However, this 
result should be taken with caution. The Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000) study combined 
voluntary  and  mandatory  demands  and  they  did  not  account  for  the  effect  of  voluntary 
demand separately. This might be the reason why the price for RECs was higher than the 
equilibrium  price  in  their  experiments.  The  experiment  described  in  this  article  aims  to 
separate the effect of the presence of voluntary demand on price of RECs under a non-binding 
price control. In this experiment, the demand for units is mandatory (there is no voluntary 
demand) to make the results of the effect of the penalty specific for mandatory demand.  
This experiment can be used to provide regulators with information concerning the likely 
effect of the penalty imposed on retailers in a duopolistic market structure on the supply side 
on the price for RECs. This can help to set optimal policy. The results showed that if the 
penalty is set higher than the competitive equilibrium price (at the intersection of supply of 
RECs and mandatory demand for them), there is a potential for price of REC being higher 
than competitive equilibrium and just under the level of penalty due to a) public knowledge of 
the existence of the penalty imposed on retailers for non-compliance, b) public knowledge of 
the level of penalty and c) market power of producers. Stylised experiment presented in this 
article highlighted that sellers’ knowledge of the existence of the penalty and its level in the 
duopoly  market  pushed  prices  for  REC  higher  than  would  occur  in  competitive  market 
without penalty or without knowledge of the existence and level of the penalty. The level of 
penalty was used by sellers as a “focal” point for setting the price for the unit.  University of Queensland  Galina Ivanova  School of Economics 
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The advantage of this for the development of renewable energy technologies is obvious in the 
initial  short  run  –  investments  in  renewable  energy  technologies  will  be  attractive  for 
electricity  producers.  However,  in  the  long  run,  overcapacity  of  renewable  energy 
technologies  compared  with  the  required  mandatory  production  of  electricity  from  such 
technologies  can  reduce  profit  of  electricity  producers  and  lead  to  reducing  returns  on 
investments. This result was demonstrated by Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000). 
Another important result was that the market needs time to become efficient – the learning 
effect in such a market is very important. Therefore, abolishing the current policy too early 
would not allow the market to come to it’s long-run equilibrium. An additional experimental 
test
9 including 4 sellers and 4 buyers was conducted by the author to investigate the effect of 
increasing competition on supply side. The results showed that increasing competition on 
supply side (from 2 to 4 sellers) does not eliminate the effect of presence of penalty – the 
prices for REC in the experiment were higher than theoretical prices. Further research is 
needed to elicit the effect of the market structure (i.e. duopoly on supply) when penalty is 
imposed on the buyers, e.g. the effect of knowledge of the level of penalty. 
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